International Calamity: Human Rights Policy

When I fist heard the term “Bidun,” I thought it was some derivation of the more familiar word “Bedouin.” Although the two Arabic words sound similar, they have distinct definitions. “Bidun” means “without” while “Bedouin” translates to “those who live in the desert.” While many Bidun are in fact Bedouin, the two words have different meanings.

The Bidun are a stateless popluation living primarily in Kuwait and Bahrain. Most lack legal status because their families did not receive documentation before 1920 or because they entered the nation illegally. Today the Bidun population in Kuwait numbers between 90,000 - 180,000.

Lack of legal status affects every aspect of Bidun life. Bidun do not receive the same handsome state subsidies provided to most Kuwaiti citizens, and they face discrimination in access to education, employment, health care and official identification. According to the RI report, women and children are especially vulnerable to the hardships of statelessness. Stateless Bidun women are more likely to suffer from domestic violence (due to increased family stress) and sexual harassment from government officials. Lack of documentation regularly prevents them from accessing hospitals and gaining employment, driving many into prostitution. Bidun children receive inferior education and many instead work illegally under poor conditions.

The nationality laws in Kuwait contribute to the problem of statelessness as citizenship is passed only through paternal lineage.  Thus not only are children of Bidun women born into statelessness, but children of Kuwaiti women and Bidun men lose their Kuwaiti status.  Although the Kuwaiti government has taken small steps toward addressing the problems of statelessness, implementation has not followed. The RI report sites Bidun women saying their only hope is to marry a Kuwaiti man, and some even choose not to have children to avoid perpetuating their stateless status.

When Salah Fadalah, a former member of parliament and leader of a committee designed to process naturalization of the Bidun, was directly confronted with the problem of gender discrimination in nationality law, his response was that Kuwaiti women can simply divorce their stateless husbands. The answer is neither for Bidun women to be childless or for Kuwaiti women to divorce their husbands. The Kuwaiti government must reform its nationality law, allowing citizenship to be passed equally by mother and father.

RI report: http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/kuwait-gender-discrimination-creates-statelessness-and-endangers-families

On Sunday King Abdullah unexpectedly announced that Saudi women would gain the right to vote, be able to run for municipal elections, and be appointed to the Majlis Al-Shura, an all-male consultative council that advises the monarchy.  On Tuesday, a woman was sentenced to ten lashes for defying the Kingdom’s ban on women driving.

Although Saudi women have been increasingly vocal in calling for their political rights throughout the past decade, the most recent issue about which they have raised their voices is the ban on driving.  Although there is no law on the books prohibiting women from driving, there is a de facto ban as women are not issued the required driver’s licenses.  Women have to rely on expensive live-in drivers or male relatives to take them around.

Photo: Fayez Nureldine, AFP / Getty Image

Many Saudi women remain very critical of the painstakingly slow and limited steps taken by King Abdullah. The second-ever municipal elections occurred today (4 days after the King’s decree..) but women were not permitted to participate and cannot exercise their newly granted right to vote until the next election in 2015.  Additionally the councils for which they vote have very limited powers, including little more than approving a municipal budget, suggesting planning regulations and overseeing city projects. Likewise the Majlis Al-Shura council to which women will now be appointed is only a consultative body and appointed by the royal family with no real authority.  And there are no provincial or parliamentary elections.  Ultimately Saudi Arabia is an ultra-conservative monarchy in which the right to vote provides little to no power over the constitution of government and politics.

The democratic demands of the “Arab Spring” have left King Abdullah fearful of the spread of anti-regime protests across the Kingdom.  His support for the violent Bahraini crackdown and the $93 billion benefits package offered to Saudis in March are part of his efforts to quell rising dissatisfaction with the state. Granting women the right to vote in four years (and revoking the lashing sentence) is an attempt to sideline the demand for the right to drive without pissing of the powerful conservative segment of Saudi society. 

It doesn’t take more than a quick glance at today’s news headlines to see the weakness of the current international human rights regime.  While I don’t want to deny the value of human rights in providing norms and legal language for victims of abuse, any examination of the state of human rights across the globe necessarily makes me wonder: what’s the point?

Just a little over a year ago, Obama averred “next year, we can have an agreement that can lead to a new member of the United Nations, an independent, sovereign state of Palestine living in peace with Israel.”  Next week, the US alone is likely to veto the Palestinian Authority’s statehood bid in the UN Security Council.  

The gap between human rights rhetoric and policy is not isolated to the Israel/Palestine conflict, the Middle East, President Obama, nor the U.S.  The fundamental inability to secure “human rights” is historic and universal.

The philosophical foundation of human rights lies in the distinction between natural and legal rights.  The Stoics are frequently looked to as the originators of “human rights,” as they are attributed with bringing the idea of human equality to political thought.  The age of Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions further defined fundamental natural rights, which evolved throughout the 20th century into today’s  human rights regime.

Before natural and human rights became conceptualized as a basis for social life, long had existed the idea of citizenship rights.  Citizenship rights are granted by one’s membership in a politically sovereign entity, while human rights are universal, inherent in every individual.  Over time citizenship rights extended to include more groups and more rights, a path human rights is now following. 

The challenge for strengthening international human rights is not only one of enforcement, but also requires developing an international sense of community, necessary for the provision of social rights.  Although human rights have grown remarkably since the Enlightenment, they cannot be fully realized without the creation of a global community, or international citizenship.  Although identifying these potential steps for increasing effectiveness of the human rights regime, I don’t feel any more optimistic about tomorrow’s news..

As the date of the Palestinian Authority’s UN statehood bid draws nearer, the likelihood that the outcome will not improve the lives of Palestinians, but will instead erupt in violence appears ever greater.

Palestinian American organizations have “unequivocally” spoken out against the upcoming vote, arguing that the PA’s statehood attempt “unjustifiably and irresponsibly endangers Palestinian rights and institutions.”  The US Palestinian Communities Network (USPCN) joined the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions National Committee in dismissing the statehood bid as a mechanism for furthering the Palestinian right to self-determination.  Self-determination for the Palestinian people requires ending the Israeli occupation, treating Palestinians within Israel with full equality, and honoring the right of return, none of which a successful UN bid will bring about. 

Although the UN vote will not bring about any real advancements in securing Palestinian rights, it does carry a potential for an outbreak of violence (what doesn’t in this region?).  As protests are expected to ensue following the bid, the likelihood of an escalation of violence rose this week as Israeli authorities have administered “non lethal” weapons, including tear gas and stun grenades to settlers throughout the West Bank.  The Israeli authorities are reportedly preparing for defense of settlements and are engaged in an ongoing process of training settlers “to deal with any possible scenario.”  The army has established two virtual boundaries around Israeli settlements.  If Palestinians cross the first line, they will be met with “crowd dispersal tactics” from the settlers.  If they cross the second “red line,” soldiers are permitted to shoot them in their legs.  Where these lines are, and how Palestinians will be made aware of the boundaries, remains unclear. The history of violence between settlers and Palestinians, and frequent accusations of settlers’ legal immunity, makes this advanced preparation likely an ingredient for escalating violence.

An armed settler in Hebron

It is not just the possibility of ensuing violence that makes this vote potentially dangerous.  The yet uncertain consequences of internationally recognized statehood could be detrimental for Palestinian rights. Where will the borders of the state be, and who will be its citizens? What would a territorially defined state mean for Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza?  Where does it leave for the PLO?  And how would UN statehood affect the legitimacy of the right of return?

The United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) passed a resolution yesterday demanding an end to the Syrian government’s crackdown against anti-government protesters and dispatching an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the violence. Following a previous UN report which documented brutal violations occurring between March and July, this inquiry seeks to identify those committing crimes against humanity and hold them accountable.

Besides condemning and investigating, what can the UN do?  The veto structure of the UN Security Council will likely limit any substantial action.  Both China and Russia (Security Council members with veto power) voted against yesterday’s HRC resolution.  They have also both voiced opposition to a draft resolution calling for for sanctions against President Assad, his family and officials, that is currently circulating among the Security Council members.

The UNSC veto power also precludes the International Criminal Court from launching an investigation into the crimes occurring in Syria. Syria (like the US and Libya) does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, thus they cannot independently open an investigation into Syria.  The only way for the ICC to do so is through a UNSC referral (as occurred with Libya).  Although the crimes occurring in Syria are certainly comparable to those under Qaddafi and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights last week suggested the Security Council refer Syria to the ICC, the power of the veto is likely to further illustrate the politicization of our so-called international institutions for justice.

Three people were reportedly killed on Monday when security forces opened fire after a crowd of protesters made themselves visible to a UN convoy.  At least 15 people have been killed in the past 24 hours.  Over 2200 have been killed since the demonstrations began. More “urgent and proper action,” as called for by the EU foreign policy chief, is certainly needed, yet hope of the veto-member-dominated UN playing a role in any cessation of the violence appears tragically dim.

The reluctance to accept refugees is historical and universal. One obstacle for a host country in accepting and providing adequate care for refugees is of course the financial cost. Other reasons for reluctance include shortages of resources and space, xenophobia, and fear of permanence. Economic and political factors are usually intertwined in a country’s reasons for reducing the inflow of refugees.  Less common is the overtly political rejection in face of a already existing facilities, as in the current case in Kenya where 1400 Somalis fleeing famine arrive daily.

Dadaab refugee camp in northern Kenya is considered the largest camp in the world, housing over 400,000 in an area designed to accommodate 90,000. It is a complex that consists of three camps, Hagadera, Ifo and Dagahaley. With 40,000 refugees arriving in July, new camps are desperately needed. While “Ifo III,” a tent settlement, has recently sprouted up to accommodate the new arrivals, the mud-brick houses of neighboring “Ifo II” remain empty. Construction of Ifo II (designed to hold 80,000 people) began last year, but was halted by the Kenyan government, fearing it would encourage more Somali refugees to cross the border. While refugees continue to pour into Kenya, Ifo II remains closed as according Kenya’s Assistant Internal Security Minister, the camp is not a solution to the food crisis. Ifo II is not a solution to the food crisis and much more needs to be done by the international community, but it’s new schools, health center and 1,100 houses would provide greater refuge to those fleeing famine and slightly relieve the strain of overcrowding so consequential in Dadaab today.

The right to self-determination is a fundamental principle of international law and spelled out in the usual gamut of international human rights agreements including the Charter of the UN; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights among others.  As with other rights so well defined in this canon, the struggle to attain the right to self determination is grossly incomplete.  The Israeli occupation of Palestine provides just one example of the utter failure of these international agreements to impact human rights reality. 

The upcoming Palestinian statehood bid appears to offer an avenue for self-determination and justice for the Palestinians (albeit in the face of US opposition in the UN).  In an effort to circumvent the expected US Security Council veto, Resolution 377 or the “Uniting for Peace” provision can be used to bring the vote back to the General Assembly.  The “Uniting for Peace” resolution is a Cold War era mechanism (initiated by the US to override Soviet veto during the Korean War) that allows for the General Assembly to issue non-binding recommendations if there is a “lack of unanimity of the permanent members” in times of a “threat for peace and security.”  While only the Security Council can recommend states for UN membership, recognition by the General Assembly could upgrade Palestine from the status of “observer” to “non-member state.”  Non-member state status would give Palestine all the rights of a full membership except voting.  Such an “upgrade” in Palestine’s UN status would in reality change little as Palestine already has special rights to reply, raise points of order, co-sponsor some resolutions and make interventions in the General Assembly.

A successful General Assembly vote would thus provide little more than a symbolic victory.  A UN recommendation will not dismantle settlements throughout the West Bank, improve the lives of the nearly two million refugees living within the fragmented boundaries of a future state, nor provide greater governmental legitimacy to the PA.  The struggle for self-determination cannot be achieved through the UN alone, but must be part of a larger human rights focused approach to ending the occupation.

HRW Report on Bahraini government attacks on medical personnel, wounded protesters, and health facilities:

http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2011/07/18/targets-retribution-0